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Who's Running the Road? Street
Railway Strikes and the Problem of
Constructing a Liberal Capitalist
Order in Canada, 1886-1914
Eric Tucker*

Street railway strikes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were frequently the occasion for largescale collective violence in N orth Ameri
can cities and challenged the capacity of local authorities to maintain civic
order. However, this was only the most visible manifestation of the challenge
that street railway workers' collective action posed to the order of liberal
capitalism, an order constructed on several intersecting dimensions. Using the
example of Canadian street railway workers from 1886 to 1914 , a period of
rapid urbanization and industrialization, this article explores the ways the
collective action by workers and their community sympathi zers challenged
the workplace , marketplace , and "streetplace" orders of liberal capitalism. It
discusses how those challenges were met through political and legal processes of
resistance and accommodation , taking into account the fragmentation of state
power, hostile public opinion toward the street railways , and conflicting views
over the legitimate scope for workers' collective action.
Give us this road and we will run it. [Anonymous protester, 1899]
( Palmer 1976, 122)
The streets of a city are for business, not for demonstrations.

( Toronto Globe, 1902e)
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INTRODUCTION: WORKERS' COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
WORKPLACE, MARK'ETPLACE, AND STREETPLACE ORDER

Canadian street railway strikes between 1886 and 1914, a period of rapid
urbanization and industrialization, are most remembered for the large-scale
communal violence that frequently accompanied them. There were at least
seventeen strikes by streetcar workers, and significant collective violence occurred
in thirteen of them (Table 1).1 On five occasions-London, Ontario, in 1899, Toronto
in 1902, Winnipeg in 1906, Hamilton in 1906, and Saint John in 1914-the militia was
called in to deal with the perceived threat to civic order. Yet the story of conflict is
reflective of a more general phenomenon; workers' collective action has always fit
uneasily in liberal capitalist societies, even though it has been present in one form
or another, requiring a societal response and often being a force for social reform.
This uneasy fit arises from the fact that workers' collective action potentially
interferes with the paradigmatic order of liberal capitalism on at least three
overlapping dimensions.2 Most directly, workers' collective action challenges the
ideal workplace order of liberal capitalism in which the owners of capital are free to
decide how to use their wealth, with whom they will contract and on what terms,
and how production will be organized, subject only to the constraints of a labor
market in which individual workers compete in selling their capacity to work. The
street railway workers' demands for union recognition and for a grievance procedure
clearly challenged the workplace order their employers sought and claimed as a
right to impose-employer unilateralism- and sought to replace it with a different
regime, described by David Brody (1993) as "workplace contractualism" (221)
characterized by collectively bargained contracts that governed labor-management
relations. Collective action to realize this transformation in the workplace order
and employer resistance were the underlying causes of most street railway strikes

during the period under consideration.
The outcome of struggles over workplace order partly depended on the
marketplace and streetplace orders, which were also often sites of contesta- tion
between workers and employers. Workers' collective action threatened to upset the
ideal marketplace or economic order of liberal capitalism, char- acterized by the
freedom of individuals to pursue their self-interest in markets with a minimum of
interference from third parties by counterposing the principle and practice of
worker solidarity-a view expressed most clearly in the slogan of the Knights of Labor,
"An injury to one is an injury to all."3 Most obviously, collective worker action
aimed

to disrupt

the capitalist

labor market through the creation of quasi

monopolies over labor supply, but it also was liable to pose a broader threat by
interfering with other market exchanges. For example, workers might attempt to
convince suppliers or customers not to do business with their employer until a
satisfactory agree- ment was reached. Workers employed by other firms might
come to the assistance of striking workers by refusing to handle struck work, or they
might strike against their own employers to enforce their fellow workers' demands.
Collective action could also indirectly interfere with the operation of the
marketplace when, for example, an industrial dispute interrupted the produc- tion or
distribution of goods and services, such as fuel supplies, upon which a large number
of other businesses or individuals depended. Street railway strikes challenged the
economic order most directly by disrupting the urban transportation infrastructure
that had facilitated the growth of cities, the creation of concentrated downtown
business districts, and the dispersion of the population thereby making workers,
shoppers, and downtown businesses increasingly dependent on their service (Olsen

1991, 251-52; Warner 1962, 15-29; Fogelson 2001, 9-43).

TABLE 1.
Canadian Street Railway Strikes, 1886-1914
Place

Toronto, ON

Date & Duration

Mar. 1886 (3 days}

Workplace Issues

Firing of union members

Streetplace Events

Crowds blocked tracks; cars
damaged; confrontations with
police; police and citizens

Toronto, ON

May-June 1886

Firing of union members

injured
Crowds blocked tracks; cars
damaged; confrontations with
police; police and citizens

Hamilton, ON

Sept. 1892 (3 days)

Firing of union members

London, ON

Oct. 1898 (15 days}

Firing of union members;
working conditions; union

State Responses

Police attempted to keep tracks
clear and protect co. property;

Strike Outcome

Union members reinstated

arrests resulting in fines and
imprisonment

Police and mounted police
attempted to keep tracks dear

Strike lost, union disbanded

and protect co. property;
arrests resulting in fines

injured
None

None

Compromise: improved
conditions, discharged
men paid off; strikers
subsequently laid off

Cars pelted, operators taunted

None

Compromise: reinstatement,

improved conditions, right
to join union but no

recognition

recognition

London, ON

May-Nov. 1899

Firing of union membersi
working conditions; union

Escalating crowd violence
(July 8)

Riot Act read; militia called up;

Large crowds blocked cars; stones

Militia called up but strike
settled before they arrived;

recognition

Toronto, ON

June 1902 (3 days)

Firing of union members;

working conditions; union
recognition

Montreal, PQ

Feb. 1903 (2 days)

Firing of union members; wage

thrown; cars damaged

Strike lost

arrests resulting in fines and
imprisonment

arrests

Union win: right to organize
recognhed; grievance
procedurei wage increase

Minor crowd violence

Local police; few arrests

Union victory

Minor crowd violence

Local policei few arrests

Company victory; Feb.

increase; union recognition

Montreal, PQ

May 1903 (4 days)

Wages and working conditions;
grievance procedure; union

recognition; closed shop

agreement restored; local
association replaces

AASRE

TABLE 1.
( Continued )
Place

Date & Duration

Cornwall, ON
Winnipeg,
MB

June 1905 (7 days)
Mar. 1906 (9days)

London, ON

July 1906 (21 days)

Workplace Issues

Wage increase

Union recognition, wages

Streetplace Events

State Responses

None
Crowd violence; strikebreakers
assaulted pickets

None
Riot Act read; militia called up;

None

Local police; strike sympathizer
arrested and fined for calling

None
Escalating crowd violence

None
Riot Act read; militia called up
and deployed; arrests resulting

Strike Outcome

No change in wages
Compromise

arrests resulting in fines and

imprisonment
Discharge of union members;

working conditions

Union loss

motorman a scab

Levis, PQ
Hamilton, ON

Sept. 1906 (2 days)
Nov. 1906 (26
days)

Discharge of union activists
Discharge of union president;

failure to comply with prior
arbitration award

Winnipeg,
MB
Port Arthur,
Fort
William, ON
Halifax, NS
Saint John,
NB

in fines and imprisonment

Dec. 1910 (15
days)
May-June 1913
(I month)

Discharge of union officers

Escalating crowd violence

Local police; arrests resulting in

Discharge of employees, wage

Crowd violence; one sympathizer

Local police; arrests

May 1913 (4 days)
July 1914 (5 days)

Wage increase

fines and imprisonment

increase

Discharge of union officer and
men

shot and killed by police,
another wounded
Crowd violence; car wrecking
Crowd violence; sympathizer

shot in leg by police officer

Legend: MB (Manitoba), NB (New Brunswick), NS (Nova Scotia), ON (Ontario), PQ (Province of Quebec).

Local police; arrests
Riot Act read, soldiers charged
crowd; troops requested;
arrests

Union loss
Arbitration of disagreement
by ORMB produces
compromise
Terms not disclosed; strikers

rehired
Union loss

Compromise
9 of 11 discharged workers
reinstated

The broader the scope for workers' solidarity in the marketplace, the better their
chances to transform the workplace order. Finally, workers' collective action could
interfere with the paradigmatic streetplace or civic order of liberal capitalism, which
was characterized by the right of individuals to move freely on public streets and spaces
without being threatened or impeded by other individuals, and by the protection of
their property from invasions or obstructions.4 However, the idea expressed in the

Toronto Globe editorial excerpted at the beginning of this article-that streets were
places

for business,

not demonstrations-was opposed

by older but evolving

popular traditions of parading and protesting, sometimes peacefully and sometimes
not.5 The legitimate use of public space was highly contested in nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century

North America, and collective violence was not uncommon

(Goheen 1994, 430; Ryan 1997; Heron and Penfold 2005, 4-27; Lord 2005, 17;
Fyson 2009). While disciplined parades of striking street railway workers on city
streets stayed well within the legal boundaries of the streetplace order, raucous
gatherings of strike sympathizers that prevented streetcars from running over rights-ofway granted by munici- pal authorities clearly did not; nor did those who committed
violent attacks on street railway property or on replacement workers who operated
the cars during a strike. Traffic across the normative and legal boundaries of the
streetplace order, however, was two way. Street railway operators were also prepared
to violate legal and normative standards by hiring private security guards who carried
arms and threatened or used violence to keep the street cars running.
There is an implicit tension in the above formulation between an essentialist view
of workplace, marketplace, and streetplace orders under liberal capitalism, and the claim
made earlier that those orders were made and remade partly in response to workers'
collective action. This can be resolved, however, by distinguishing between two levels of
analytical abstraction: at the highest level of abstraction, it is both possible and useful
to identify quintessential features of a liberal order, while simultaneously, and at a
lower level of abstraction, recognizing that actually existing liberal orders are the

product of historical processes of social conflict and accom- modation between classes
and other forces.6 While this article draws on an essentialist baseline, I am not making
a functionalist claim that an idealized version of order is or was necessary

or

functionally optimal for liberal capi- talism. Rather, the claim is that a particular
vision of order lay at the core of the project of imposing liberal capitalist rule but that
such an ideal was always contested. The article's focus is on the making of actual
liberal orders, and, more particularly, on the challenges collective action by street- car
workers and their supporters in Canada created for, and the impact and it had on, the
three dimensions of liberal capitalist ordering they con- fronted. While this study is
local, the processes of constructing the liberal orders that it examines should be of
general interest to North American legal and labor historians.
The role of law and the state was central to the construction and maintenance of
order in liberal capitalism, but this does not mean that law and the state exercised a
monopoly. Legal pluralists make the important point that social order is the
product of multiple processes and that it should not be assumed that state law is
always the most significant or influ- ential (Merry 1988, 869). This perspective has
been particularly influential in the labor field, where it has been applied both
descriptively to explain how industrial relations-workplace orders-are

negotiated

and renegoti- ated on a daily basis, and normatively in defense of an approach to
labor policy that leaves the workplace parties ample room to devise and implement their own arrangements through collective bargaining rather than by having
the state directly impose terms and conditions of

employment. While this

perspective usefully draws our attention to the importance of nonstate ordering
processes, under liberal capitalism it often fails to adequately address the centrality of
law and the state in establishing the rules of the game, including the extent to which
nonstate processes will be allowed to establish workplace, marketplace, or streetplace
order. Addition- ally, the role of unequal power relations endemic in capitalist societies is
undertheorized in pluralists' explorations of nonstate ordering systems, as are its
implications for the process of determining whose vision of order becomes privileged in

state law (Kidder 1997). The approach adopted in this article places state law at the
center but understands that the role of that law and its significance relative to other
ordering processes will vary from sphere to sphere depending on a variety of factors.
The article's approach also locates state and nonstate ordering processes within the
context of a social formation, liberal capitalism-which is characterized structurally by
unequal power relations-and it explores the often conflict- ing visions and practices
of order that shaped and reshaped liberal order. Finally, the article takes care to
emphasize that in the context of street railways, decisions about enforcing order were
typically made at the lower levels of the legal and political system. There were, for
example, no high court judgments to emerge from any of the prosecutions heard mostly
in magistrates' courts, while decisions about when to use force were made by local
officials. 7
The distinction between high and low law leads to another dimension of pluralism:
the importance of recognizing that the state ordering process itself is highly fragmented
along several dimensions. First, in Canada there is the constitutional division of power
between federal and provincial governments and a further statutory delegation of power
to local authorities, all of whom share responsibility, to different degrees and in
different ways, for enacting and enforcing law. State power is further fragmented at any
particular level of government between its different branches as well as within
branches. These divisions will become especially apparent in the context of the street
railway strikes, which involved the federal and municipal governments; local and
provincial police and the militia; police magistrates; federal criminal law; and federal,
provincial, and municipal regulatory law, among others. Although it does not
necessarily follow that a highly fragmented state cannot respond forcefully and with
unity of purpose to maintain a given sociolegal order when it is perceived to be under
attack, the possibility does exist that dis- agreements over what order requires and
how to achieve it may emerge and be exploited to create more space than is normally
available to actors who generally experience state law as a set of constraints rather
than as a source of empowerment.

I.

WORKING ON THE STREET RAILWAY: THE STRUGGLE TO

CHANGE THE WORKPLACE ORDER

Street railways in the era prior to World War I were, with few exceptions, privately
owned and operated.8 Unlike other private businesses, however, street railways
enjoyed monopoly rights granted by municipalities to provide transportation services
according to terms and conditions specified in the franchise. As private, for-profit,
public service providers, they were under much greater public scrutiny and control
than most other private businesses. The creation of a street railway system involved a
large investment of capital, but it also came with an obligation to provide service at a
specified fare. The switch from horse-drawn carriages to electrified streetcars in the
1890s further increased the capital cost of the system, as did its extension to suburban
areas.
Labor costs were by far the largest variable cost, and thus street railway owners soon
learned that the profitability of their operations depended to a great extent on their
ability to keep labor costs under control ( Davis 1979; Cheape 1980; Armstrong and
Nelles 1986, 40-41). For the most part, street railways sought to achieve this objective
by keeping wages low and hours long, impos- ing strict discipline on employees, and, if
employees tried to organize a union to improve their conditions, fiercely fighting to
keep their workplaces union free.9 One technique commonly deployed by street railways
was to

hire private detective agencies that spied on their workforces to uncover

employee misbehavior and union activity.

10

This attempt to create and maintain a

private, unilateral, and authoritarian workplace order, however, often was contested by
the largest group of street railway employees: conductors and motormen. 11
While craft workers historically had been able to exert a fairly significant degree of
job control through their partial monopoly of key skills, most street railway workers,
including the conductors and drivers with whom this study is chiefly concerned, found
themselves in a different position because the skills involved in their work were either

widely held, particularly in the days of horse-drawn cars, or could be quickly learned.
For many, therefore, the primary response to the unsatisfactory work conditions they
encountered was to quit, so labor turnover was frequent among

motormen

and

conductors. While this undoubtedly caused some difficulty for employers, it was usually
not enough to spur them to improve conditions,

although eventually

some did

embrace company-sponsored employee associations as means for retaining workers and
avoiding unionization.
engaged in

12

collective

A sizable number of conductors and motormen, however, also
action

to

contest

and

reshape the

workplace

order,

notwithstanding the formidable obstacles they faced as semiskilled workers. Informal
associations were established sporadically in the 1870s, and in the 1880s the Knights of
Labor briefly succeeded in organizing street railway workers in Toronto. A more
permanent union presence, however, only emerged after the founding in 1892 of the
Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees (AASRE) by the American Federation of Labor, which began to organize locals in Canada at the end of the
nineteenth century (Schmidt 1937, 121-52; Armstrong and Nelles 1986, 22529).13 In many ways, the AASRE was in the vanguard of the so-called new unionism
that sought to organize skilled and semiskilled workers on an industrial basis with the
goal of reshaping the workplace order to more closely conform to conditions previously
available only to the most skilled (Palmer 1979, 199-216). This fact did not go
unnoted at the time. For example, following the first Montreal street railway strike,
which produced a partial victory for the union, the M ontreal Gazette noted,
The success of the men in the street railway strike . . . will go far towards establishing
a new standard of wages generally in lines of work where only ordinary skill is
required . . . . The new rates will enable them to earn yearly wages that heretofore
have been only within the power of skilled craftsmen. ( M ontreal Gazette 1903a, 6)
Even more contentious than wage and hour disputes were demands for union
recognition, the establishment of a grievance system to review man- agement
discipline, and changes in work rules. Street railway owners found these latter
demands most unpalatable since they correctly viewed them as fundamentally

inconsistent with employer unilateralism, the workplace order they wished to
maintain. The M ontreal Gazette, which staunchly defended the Montreal Street
Railway during a tumultuous strike in May 1903, articu- lated the employer's position
in one of its strike-related editorials:
There are two sets of issues. . . . One affects hours and pay. . . . The other touches the
control of the company over its property and those who it pays to operate it; and
this is the serious side of the difficulty. . . . The men left their positions for the
purpose of compelling the company to . . . recognize their union as its master. . . .
That is why the present fight must be a fight to the finish-the finish of the union with
its foreign affiliations which dares to demand the abolition of free labor and the
control of the men who operate the leading public convenience of Montreal. ( M
ontreal Gazette 1903b, 6)

Workers, too, understood that their demands challenged what they increas- ingly
viewed as an intolerably autocratic workplace order in which employers enjoyed nearly
unlimited management prerogatives based on the combina- tion of employee market
dependence

and employer property

ownership.

For street railway workers,

unionization promised not only higher wages, but also a measure of personal dignity
and a collective voice that would give them some control over the labor process. In
short,

they

were

seeking

contractualism-undergirded

to
by

establish a

new

workplace

order-workplace

the notion that terms and conditions should be

settled by negotiation and that managerial authority should be reviewable (Brody
1993).
The legal regime under which workplace order was established and contested
in the 1880s has been labeled "liberal voluntarism" (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 2).
At its core were freedom of contract and the rights of property. Employers as
owners of the means of production had the right to determine how their property
would be used, and they enjoyed the freedom to choose with whom to contract and
on what terms. Workers also enjoyed freedom of contract, which included the
privilege of joining with other workers for the purposes of improving the terms

and conditions of their employment; but employers were free to refuse to hire or to
fire workers who chose to join unions. Similarly, workers could collectively
withdraw their labor (that is, to strike) in order

to

pressure their employer to agree

to the terms and conditions they demanded; but employers, again, were free to hire
other workers to take their place. Moreover, striking workers were restricted in the
actions they could take to make their strikes effective by the employers' rights of
freedom of contract (which, for example, required striking workers not to interfere
with the hiring of replacement workers by their employers), as well as by their
private property rights (which, for example, prevented striking workers from
blocking access to their employers' premises). These restraints were embodied in
both civil and criminal law. Finally, even when settlements were reached with trade
unions they were not legally enforceable. Not only did trade unions lack legal
personality (a situation that, much to the regret of employers, also made it difficult for
employers to sue them), but also courts held that there was no intention to create legal
relations. As a result, negotiated changes to the workplace order were

potentially

unstable since both employers and unions were legally free to ignore agreements when
they thought it was to their advantage to do so. This often produced a second round
of industrial conflict. 14
The legal framework within which the workplace order was contested had
changed in two respects by 1914, leading to a regime change labeled "industrial
voluntarism" (Fudge and Tucker 2001, 16). The most significant modification was
the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA), enacted in 1907, which prohibited
strikes and lockouts in industries that were con- sidered public utilities until after
the completion of a conciliation process. Although the principal justification for this
legislation was to ameliorate the adverse effect of industrial conflict on the economic
order, it affected to some degree the conduct of disputes over the workplace order.
The other change was the introduction of limited minimum standards that made the
determi- nation of certain aspects of the workplace order a public matter for political
and regulatory authorities rather than a private issue to be resolved by con- tract

between workers and street railway companies. This occurred most commonly
when the workplace order had implications for the health and safety of workers
and members of the public (Tucker 1990). In the case of street railways, tum-of-thecentury efforts to impose apprenticeship require- ments failed, but in 1912 an
Ontario regulatory board was empowered to establish maximum hours of work for
motormen and conductors; in no case were employees to be permitted to work more
than six days a week or ten hours a day.15 Earlier, in at least one Ontario
municipality (Hamilton), the franchise agreement between the city and the street
railway established maximum hours and minimum wages.

16

In Nova Scotia,

legislation was enacted in 1911 requiring that motormen and conductors be
protected against the weather. The realm of regulated work conditions was subsequently
expanded in 1912 to include braking systems, seating, training, and working hours-all
matters that touched on both worker and public safety.17
Overall, by the end of 1914, street railway workers and their unions had managed to
make modest changes to the workplace order through a combi- nation of collective
bargaining, arbitration, and conciliation (see Part II of this article for marketplace
order), strike activity (see Part III for streetplace order), and legislated minimum
standards, although the picture varied markedly from city to city. Toronto workers
were more successful than most. Although the first organizing effort by the Knights
was resoundingly defeated in the second 1886 strike (Morton 1975, 44-56; Kealey
1980, 199-212; Tucker 1994, 295-308), the 1902 AASRE organizing campaign and
strike won the right of employees to join a union without facing retaliation, access to a
grievance procedure, and a wage increase ( Labour Gazette 1902). A new agreement,
reached the following year, provided for conciliation and binding arbitration of
grievances, as well as provisions relating to working conditions such as stools and
closed vestibules for motormen ( Labour Gazette 1903b). Although management
refused to formally recognize the union, always insist- ing that it was dealing with
employee representatives and not the union, a reasonably stable collective bargaining
relationship developed. 18 Indeed, two subsequent arbitration awards began to elaborate

the framework that came to typify industrial legality in the post-World War II era
(Palmer 1992, 278-84). In the first, involving a dispute over the dismissal of
employees found inter- fering with three other employees who had scabbed in
Winnipeg during an earlier street railway strike, the arbitration panel affirmed the
employer's "inherent right" to manage its employees subject only to the terms of
the agreement and applicable laws. In the second, the arbitrator recognized the right
of employees to refuse work that endangered their or the public's health or safety
without being disciplined beyond the loss of wages for the time they did not work (

Labour Gazette 1906e, 1908a). Subsequent agreements, reached with the assistance of
IDIA conciliation, introduced progressive discipline and additional work rules (

Labour Gazette 1910, 1912b).
Street railway workers in Hamilton ( Labour Gazette 1908b, 1909, 1913c),19 Ottawa
( Labour

Gazette

1908c, 1912a, 1914b), Quebec City ( Labour Gazette 1908d,

1913a), Saint John ( Labour Gazette 1914a; Babcock 1982), and Vancouver (Roy
1972-73, 3-10; Labour Gazette 1913d) also seemed to have established relatively
stable collective bargaining relations prior to World War I.Less successful were street
railway workers in Winnipeg, despite two violent strikes. The first, in 1906, resulted in
a wage increase but no form of union recognition. The second, in 1910, was called in
response to the termination of union officers allegedly enticed by private detectives
to violate company rules by entering a tavern while in uniform. The officers failed
to obtain their reinstatement; the strike was instead settled on the basis that the striking
men would be rehired as they were needed ( Labour Gazette 1906a, 1906b, 191la,
191lb; M otorman & Conductor 1911). Finally, street railway workers in Cornwall (
Labour Gazette 1905), Halifax (Lambly 1983, chap. 3), Levis ( Labour Gazette
1906f), London, Ontario ( Labour Gazette 1906c, 1906d), Montreal ( Labour Gazette
1903c, 1903e), and Port Arthur and Fort William ( Labour Gazette 1913e, 1913f;
Morrison 1974, chap. 9) lost strikes, and their unions either disbanded or barely
hung on. To more fully understand these outcomes, however, it is necessary to turn
our attention to the two other dimensions of liberal capitalist ordering that collective

action confronted: the economic order and the civic order.

II.

PROTECTING

THE MARKETPLACE

ORDER

AND

ITS

IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKPLACE REORDERING

The central ideological premise of early twentieth-century Canadian industrial
relations policy was that the public had an interest in limiting harm to the economic
order caused by workplace conflict. This goal was indirectly advanced by removing
some causes of workplace conflict through the direct regulation of workplace
conditions affecting health and safety, but the prin- cipal Canadian innovation was
legislation that compelled conciliation prior to a strike or lockout (Fudge and
Tucker 2001, 16-50).20 This legislation, however, only applied to those sectors of
the economy that were deemed public utilities, such as transportation, because they
provided infrastructural support for the broader economy. Street railway strikes
arguably fell within this category, although their actual impact on the local economy
was more a matter of speculation than rigorous investigation. 21 At the very least,
street railway strikes caused much inconvenience because of the growing dependence of a more dispersed urban population on their service. Additionally, even
though most street railways were privately owned, the fact that they obtained
monopoly franchises from the city strengthened the popular view that they were
public utilities that should be made subject to greater public and governmental
regulation than would otherwise be justified. As the Free Press noted in an editorial
after the settlement of the 1906 Winnipeg strike, "The civic car service is a public
franchise and the public should have the right to have representatives of the public
interest intervene, if necessary" (Winnipeg Free Press 1906h).
Legal intervention in labor disputes to protect the economic order, however, was
problematic from the perspective of liberal voluntarism, which viewed the marketplace

as a realm of freedom of contract. The dilemma, then, was how to protect the
marketplace order of liberal capitalism from the disruptive effects of labor conflict
without subverting it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the common
law was just beginning to develop economic tort doctrines that could be used to limit
secondary actions directly aimed at third parties, but it had virtually nothing to offer
when industrial conflict indirectly caused harm (Tucker and Fudge 1996). Strikes
could be prohibited by legislation, but that was not seriously considered at the time.
Rather, attention was focused on mediation and conciliation

through

the

involvement of neutral third parties-practices that were common but that occurred
almost entirely on an ad hoc and voluntary basis. For example, the Toronto civic
railway strike of March 1886 and the Montreal strike of February 1903 were settled with
the assistance of groups of aldermen, while the Toronto Board of Trade helped resolve
the Toronto strike of J une 1902, and the Winnipeg Ministerial Association mediated
the March 1906strike in that city. There was also some provincial trade dispute
legislation enacted during this period, but with one exception it operated on an entirely
voluntary basis: both parties had to agree to participate in the dispute resolution
process, though findings or recommendations were not binding (British Columbia
Legislative
Assembly 1895; Martin 1954; Mitchell 1990; McCallum 1991).22
By the turn of the twentieth century, the federal government was becoming
increasingly concerned

about the impact of industrial conflict on the national

economy and its development strategy, particularly when it affected the coal and
transportation industries. In 1900 the federal government enacted conciliation
legislation that operated on a completely voluntary basis (Conciliation Act 1900), but
when this law failed to prevent strikes on the railways, the government considered
introducing stronger measures. In 1902 it presented a bill making binding arbitration
of disputes on steam and civic railways compulsory. The bill was abandoned due to
lack of support, but the following year the government introduced a more modest
alternative in the Railway Labour Disputes Act ( 1903) (RLDA). It allowed either of the

parties, an affected municipality, or the federal government to initiate a conciliation
process before a tripartite board and, if that failed to resolve the dispute, the matter
could be sent to an arbitration board, which was fortified with quasi- judicial powers
of investigation and was required to publish a nonbinding report proposing terms
of settlement. Although the RLDA created a legal power to investigate, it did not
deviate far from the norms of liberal volun- tarism: the act neither limited the
freedom of the parties to engage in indus- trial action nor required them to accept
the board's proposed resolution

( Labour Gazette 1903d; Craven 1980, 273-79; Russell 1990, chap. 2; Webber
1991; Fudge and Tucker 2001, 34-43).
The reluctance to use more legal compulsion to protect the marketplace economic
order from the disruptive effects of industrial conflict not only sprung from
inconsistency with the vision of liberal voluntarism, but also was the product of
conflicting views between labor and capital and among their factions. The Knights of
Labor favored arbitration of disputes not because of a concern about the adverse
effect of industrial conflict on the economic order, but for both ideological and
strategic reasons. Ideologically, the Knights envisioned an economic order based on
mutuality and fairness, rather than the pursuit of self-interest, and arbitration was
seen as a means of rationally establishing the facts upon which a just workplace order
should be based. In addition, the Knights recognized that the less-skilled workers they
organized faced greater difficulties winning strikes against hostile employers who
could more easily hire replacements. Arbitration, they believed, would yield more
favorable outcomes (Kealey and Palmer 1982, 330-39) than adversarial dispute. In its
early years, the national labor federation, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada
(TLC), also supported compulsory arbitration but reversed its position in 1902 after
it became dominated by international unions affiliated with the American Federation
of Labor (AFL), a body firmly opposed to such measures.
Although the AASRE was an AFL affiliate, it departed sharply from the AFL's
position. It not only supported compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, but its

constitution required local unions to demand it in contract bargaining as a condition of
receiving international support for a strike. Like the Knights, who had a strong
presence among street railway workers during the nine- teenth century, the AASRE
understood the strategic value of arbitration.
Unlike many of the established craft unions and the railway brotherhoods, which
organized workers who exercised partial monopolies of skill, the members of the
AASRE were more easily replaceable and so found it difficult to attain some level of
union recognition. The agreement of an employer to accept arbitration was viewed as
a step toward recognition. Moreover, the refusal of an employer to arbitrate outstanding
differences played into the union's hands by strengthening its standing in the eyes of
the community: the union's willingness to accept the verdict of neutral observers made
its position seem reasonable, in contrast to that of recalcitrant employers who put their
interests ahead of the community's (Harring 1986). For example, the Toronto Globe
published an editorial prior to the June 1902 strike noting, "The company operating a
profitable public service, which in these

days refuses to arbitrate, necessarily and

properly antagonizes reasonable public opinion" (Toronto Globe 1902a). In subsequent
editorials published during and in the aftermath of the strike, the Globe reiterated its
support for arbi- tration and complimented the union for its willingness to submit its
demands to a process in which "the parties are to come together, lay aside all considerations of superior force or cleverness, and simply say about each proposition as it
comes up: 'Is it fair? ls it reasonable?"' ( Toronto Globe 1902b).23 Similarly, the Winnipeg

Free Press published an editorial following the settlement of the 1906 strike,
regretting the absence of a formal arbitration clause in the agreement, while the
Reverend Charles Stewart blamed the strike and the resulting troubles on the company
because it had refused arbitration (Winnipeg Free Press 1906f, 1906g).
Community and AASRE support for compulsory arbitration of civic railway
disputes, however, was not strong enough to overcome TLC, employer, and
government resistance to such measures. This was reflected in the Ontario Railway
and Municipal Board Act (1906) (ORMBA), which contained two provisions

directly related to labor disputes on railways and street railways. Section 58 of the
act allowed the board to arbitrate street railway disputes that were submitted to it by
the parties, provided the parties also agreed to abide by its decision, and so it was a
purely voluntary measure; while section 59 permitted the board to conduct quasijudicial hearings into a strike or lockout that harmed the public and to publish its
findings with recommendations for settlement. The following year, the federal
government enacted the above-mentioned Industrial Disputes Investigation Act
(1907) (IDIA), which applied to the coal industry and other public utilities, including street railways. Although street railway strikes were not the government's primary
concern, Minister of Labour Rodolphe Lemieux cited the bitter experience of the
1906 Hamilton strike when speaking in favor of the bill (Canadian House of
Common 1906-1907, 3010). The IDIA went a step further than previous legislation
by requiring conciliation before the parties could legally engage in strikes or lockouts,
but continued to refuse to compel the parties to accept binding arbitration to establish
the terms of the disputed workplace order. As Jeremy Webber (1991) noted in his
study of the origins of the IDIA, "Its purpose was to tame the exercise of economic
power, not displace it. Its goal was to reproduce the kinds of results that an
unconstrained ordering would have generated, but without the disruption of strikes"
(46). In short, the government resolved the dilemma of protecting the liberal capitalist economic order without undermining it through mandatory concilia- tion,
hoping that the IDIA would eliminate unnecessary conflict by fostering rational, selfinterested bargaining constrained by the weight of public opinion.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the IDIA protected the economic order
by reducing the incidence and duration of street railway strikes. Data collected by
Benjamin Squires (1918) indicates that from the time the IDIA came into force until
the end of 1914 it was invoked eighteen times in street railway disputes, and strikes
occurred in only two of those instances. His data also show that there were three
street railway disputes for which boards were not constituted and in which there were
strikes (Squires 1918, see Tables 3 and 5). It seems fair to conclude that the IDIA

was frequently invoked in disputes between street railways and the AASRE and that
it facilitated settlements in some cases. Moreover, in the pre-World War I period, the
act was strongly supported by AASRE officials, who viewed it as providing an
opportunity for a weak union such as theirs to gain a foothold (Lambly 1983, 62-94;
Fudge and Tucker 2001, 77-79).
It is somewhat easier to assess the impact of the IDIA and other forms of conciliation
on the workplace order. In general, according to Webber (1988a), IDIA boards took
the view that "employers remained masters of their enterprise, obligated to provide
a decent living to their employees, but not to share the prerogatives of property" (232).
This translated into a general refusal by boards to recommend union recognition, a step
that interfered with management's right not to negotiate with outsiders. Instead,
boards often recommended that an employer agree to meet with a delegation of its
own employees and generally endorsed the right of employees to join a union
without suffering discrimination. When, however, complaints were made that
employees were discharged for union activity, boards were reluctant to con- tradict
management's claim that it was disciplining workers for work rule infractions
(Webber 1988b). In short, it generally endorsed only modest reforms to the
predominant regime of employer unilateralism and market subordination.
This pattern was clearly evident in the street railway disputes that were considered
under both the ORMBA and the IDIA. For example, in the first application of the
ORMBA, arising out of a strike by street railway employees in London, Ontario, over
the discharge of three union members, a majority of the board could not find evidence
that the men were discharged "simply" because of their union activity ( Labour Gazette
1906d, 318). Similarly, over the dissent of the union nominee, the first IDIA board
involving street railway workers also upheld the dismissal of the union president in
Hamilton for work rule violations one year after a bitter strike ( Labour Gazette 1908b).24
Later boards often sought a compromise, on the one hand "supporting the authority of
the manager to preserve discipline," while on the other recom- mending reinstatement
without back pay based on the employee's long record of loyal service.25

Similarly, on the issue of union recognition, boards were reluctant to directly
challenge management rights and instead sought a compromise with which both sides
could live. For example, in the London, Ontario, concilia- tion referred to above, the
board rejected the men's demand for union recognition but supported their right to join
a union without discrimination: "There is no law compelling the company to treat
with the union. That is a matter that will have to go on as it has done heretofore. Let
them treat with the union as they see fit, just as the men can form a union if they
see fit" ( Labour Gazette 1906d). There were, however, some exceptional cases when
union recognition was advised, but even when a contract with the union was signed,
employers often continued to resist. For example, to resolve a heated and violent strike
in Hamilton in 1906, the parties agreed to submit their dispute to binding arbitration by
the ORMBA, which awarded the union formal recognition. A year later (as mentioned
above) the employer fired the union president

who had led the strike, allegedly

discriminated against other union members, and supported the formation of a rival
union. The dispute was referred to an IDIA board for conciliation, where the majority
rejected the union's complaints. Their comments about the conduct of the interna- tional
officer who had presented the local union's case reflected the prevalent attitude of
conciliation boards toward management rights and union recognition:
The attitude of this gentleman toward the officers of the employing companies was
such that even had the latter been inclined to make a compromise, they could not well
have done so with proper self respect and due regard to the discipline of their
employees, and it is submitted that better results would be obtained by employees in
industrial disputes, and there would be fewer of such disputes if the foreign element
were eliminated from them. ( Labour Gazette 1908b)

The union, weakened by internal divisions and operating in a

generally hostile

climate toward unions, was not in a position to pursue its grievances through strike
action ( Labour Gazette 1907a, 1908b).26
Finally, compulsory conciliation made a modest contribution toward changing other

dimensions of the workplace order. Although boards were, in principle, committed to
the idea that male workers should be paid a living wage that would enable them to
support a family, an IDIA board report, issued in relation to a dispute between
Vancouver street railway workers and their employers, declined to recommend a wage
increase despite finding that the existing wage scale fell considerably short of this
ideal. It concluded that "wages under the present constitution of society are governed in
the last analysis by the law of supply and demand" (quoted in Lambly 1983, 75). Thus,
while IDIA boards from time to time recommended wage increases and endorsed some
modest changes in work rules, to a great extent they accepted that the workplace order
was to be determined according to market forces, as the norms of liberal voluntarism
dictated. As a result, street railway unions also sought to make some aspects of
workplace ordering a public issue, par- ticularly as it related to matters of the health
and safety of both workers and the public. As noted earlier, legislation was enacted in
Ontario and Nova Scotia establishing minimum standards related to hours of work,
training, seating, and braking systems.

III. STREET RAILWAY STRIKES AND THE CHALLENGE TO
STREETPLACE ORDER

Street railway strikes commonly started with an orderly parade of the motormen
and conductors through city streets, where they received wide- spread community
support.27 The slogan "We Will Walk" appeared on badges worn by the public and in
newspaper advertisements placed by local mer- chants, while local politicians and
civic leaders expressed their support for the workers' right to organize and earn a fair
day's pay. None of these actions, however, altered the street railway company's plan
to defeat the union by operating with hardened strikebreakers and private guards
obtained from detective agencies. Crowds of strike sympathizers gathered around

the car barns and on the streets to express their displeasure at the railways' efforts to
continue operating with scab labor. Often these expressions became quite boisterous and
pushed the boundaries of legality. In addition to insults, rocks and other missiles might
be hurled at the cars and their scab drivers as they drove along their routes. Cars might
be physically impeded or lines sabotaged. Eventually, more widespread collective
violence might occur, which was characterized by low levels of coordination and
moderately low salience of violent interactions. 28 The challenge to the streetplace or
civic order was often substantial and posed significant problems for public authorities
who had to decide where the boundaries of toleration should be drawn and what
measures should be taken when those boundaries were crossed. As discussed below, the
answers to these questions varied considerably, although in all cases where the salience
of collective violence increased beyond scattered attacks, coercive state power was
mobilized to bring it to an end.
To better understand what shaped these "repertoires

of

contention" (Tilly 1993,

264),29 it will be helpful to examine the strategy and tactics of unions and employers,
the law under which they operated, the identities of the participants, and the
motivations for challenging civic order. Broadly speaking, the strategy of the street
railway unions was to force employers to agree to its demands by disrupting business
as usual. Its principal tactics were the withdrawal of labor and the encouragement of
riders to boycott the railway. The strategy of street railway companies was to maintain
service by hiring replacement workers and running the cars regardless. American detective agencies got into the business of providing professional strikebreakers, and their
services were widely used in Canada (Levinson 1935; Norwood 2002, 45-63; Smith

2003, 39-54). This was perfectly legal as long as the strikebreakers were not imported
under contract in violation of the Alien Labour Act (1897).30
The tactical dilemma for striking workers was how to make their strike effective
when the law governing streetplace order severely limited their ability to disrupt their
employer's operations. It was clearly illegal for striking workers or their sympathizers to
physically interfere with their employer's property or to impede the streetcars, to assault

or intimidate strikebreakers, or to interfere with members of the public who wished
to use the service.
Striking workers could lawfully withdraw their own labor and attempt to
persuade other workers not to take their places. Moreover, apart from legali- ties, it
was also important for street railway workers to maintain as much public support
for their cause as they possibly could. This required them to behave respectably,
which for the most part they did, limiting themselves to orderly parades that were
clearly legal and to consumer boycotts whose legality was uncertain but that were
widely viewed as legitimate despite condemnations by editorial writers in the
business press.31
The same could not be said for the crowds of sympathizers that gathered both outside
the car barns and on the streets and engaged in raucous and at times illegal and
violent behavior. Sometimes strikebreakers instigated vio- lence too, drawing their guns
and attacking striking workers or individuals in the crowd. Much of this behavior was
clearly criminal, but often the bound- aries of legal toleration were stretched, and the
law was not strictly enforced. The picture changed, however, when collective violence
escalated and became more salient, to include the destruction of streetcars, attacks on
railway offices, and assaults on scabs. Police who intervened were often mobbed and
persons under arrest freed. At that point, the enforcement effort would be stepped up.
The mayor might read the Riot Act, requiring all persons to leave the area immediately,
and the Canadian militia might be called up in aid of the civilian power. 32
What accounts for the unusual frequency and level of collective vio- lence in
street railway strikes? A variety of views have been offered to explain crowd violence,
some of which focus more on the breakdown of normal constraints, while others
emphasize the sources of discontent and the cultural and ideological factors that
legitimized the use of violence in particular contexts (Torrance 1986). More
recently, Tilly (2003, 5-12) has emphasized a relational analysis that focuses on the
social interactions that lead to and shape collective violence. Our focus here is
primarily on the interaction between social relations, the sources of discontent, and

popular beliefs.
It is helpful to begin by asking who was in these crowds. It is important to reiterate
that the striking workers were not the main participants; indeed, union officials
distanced the union from the crowd and denounced the vio- lence. By all accounts,
the crowds comprised a cross section of the working- class population of the
community in which the strike occurred. The press did not generally comment on the
ethnicity of participants except in the Port Arthur and Fort William strike, where it
emphasized the role of Finnish and Hungarian immigrants (Morning Herald (Fort
William) 1913b),33 who, according to a government observer, were "inflamed by
socialist agitation" (Public Archives of Canada). In that strike's aftermath, the Ottawa

Journal (1913) commented that the "'bad actors' in the industrial world in America
almost invariably are foreigners, men who do not seem to understand to the full what
law means in this country." Women and girls were also present, as were some
members of the more respectable classes. This led Hamilton Police Chief Smith to
express his disappoinment "that so many respectable citizens and their wives were seen
on the streets" during the 1906 violence ( Hamilton Spectator 1906a).34 However, it
was young men who took the lead in the more aggressive crowd actions, which is
consistent

with the observation that young, single men figure disproportionately in

collective violence (Courtwright 1996).
Yet a narrow focus on the role of young men fails to explain why street railway
strikes were the occasion for collective violence so much more often than other types
of strikes. Certainly one factor was that in street railway strikes there was a much
greater opportunity for strike sympathizers to directly confront the employer than in
most other contexts, simply because so much of the work was performed on public
streets rather than on private property from which the public could be readily
excluded. Gatherings of excited crowds, often on a Friday night or Saturday
afternoon, provided a more permissive environment for displays of youthful
rebelliousness and bravado. The Toronto Globe picked up this psychological and
behavioralist theme in an editorial published after the sentencing of some of those

arrested for their involvement in the Hamilton confrontations. "The conscious
personality of the individual was absorbed and lost in the unconscious personality
of the crowd" (Toronto Globe 1906). A narrow focus on crowd psychology, however, is
not enough. It needs to be supplemented by an examination of the under- lying
reasons for the hostility toward the street railway, without which the likelihood of
communal violence would have been quite low, despite the opportunities that were
available.
One factor noted in many studies about the street railway companies' unpopularity
was that, with few exceptions, they were private businesses providing a public service
pursuant to a monopoly franchise obtained from the
provisions

regarding

service,

city. The franchise

contained

road maintenance, and fares, all issues that

regularly became contentious. As Babcock ( 1982) noted, "The location of lines, the
efficiency of service, and the fares charged were a constant concern of the
citizenry" (6), and street railway companies' owners were commonly portrayed in
the press as rich monopolists exploiting the public (Armstrong and Nelles 1986, 3855; Kostal 1999, 289; Heron forthcoming).
This characterization of the street railway fed into a populist worldview that allied
the beleaguered community with street railway workers who also were easily seen to
be the monopolist's victims and who were well known to the passengers who rode the
lines regularly ( Molloy 1996, 35-38). There was, as well, widespread working-class
community support for many of union's basic demands: a right to collective
representation, a grievance procedure, a living wage, reasonable hours of work, and
basic amenities.35 The fact that the union was prepared to put its demands before
impartial arbitrators strength- ened the public's view of their reasonableness. And
finally, the street railway companies' choice of tactics, particularly the use of scab
labor and the hiring of professional strikebreakers, violated the "moral economy" of
the crowd (referred to as "a false moral code" in the M ontreal Gazette (1903e) ). All
of this hostility was like kindling, awaiting a spark or two to set it off; and when it did,
a significant number of people were prepared to draw on older tradi- tions of rough

justice that justified violations of the current legal norms governing streetplace
behavior (Thompson 1971; Palmer 1992, 66-69; see 1997). Phillips Thompson, a
lawyer turned labor journalist (writing under the pseudonym of Enjolras), captured
this sentiment in a comment on the dis- turbances surrounding the 1886 Toronto
street railway strike:

Whenever there is long continued and deep-seated injustice-wherever human rights
are defied and trampled upon, there will be aroused a spirit of

resistance

which

sometimes may overpass its legitimate bounds.
. . . But we do say that however misled or inconsiderate or even criminal some
actions done in the heat of the conflict between Labor and capital- ism may be, the
responsibility for those actions rests on the individuals, and the system which
provoked them. (Enjolras [Thompson] 1886)
Most public commentators, however, did not empathize with the moral economy of
the working-class crowd and were highly critical of the violence. For example, the

Halifax Herald , which only recently had portrayed the street railway owners as
corrupt monopolists, splashed a headline across its front page the morning after the
violent confrontations, freely mixing news with editorial comment: "Rioters For Time
In Partial Control At Halifax But Law And Order Must Be Maintained" ( Halifax

Herald 1913). Union officials understood that there was very limited public tolerance
for violence in their communities and were quick to condemn it. Speaking to the press
after collective violence during the 1906 Winnipeg street railway strike, Fred Fay, an
AASRE representative, promised that "everything possible will be done to prevent the
destruction of property and the injury of the cars" (Winnipeg Free Press 1906a). In
short, there was no organized group seeking to expand the violence or exacerbate
further divisions

between

street

railway

companies and their employees or the

communities they served, and this undoubtedly helped

to prevent

the collective

violence from escalating.
However, even without further escalations, once the violence intensified beyond

sporadic individual actions, local officials were pressed to regain control of the streets.
In Montreal, for example, after collective violence significantly reduced the ability of
the company to provide service, the board of trade called an emergency meeting at
which it passed a resolution calling the mayor's attention to the fact that the law was
being "systematically and openly violated" and demanding that the police be instructed
to vigorously enforce it ( M ontreal Gazette 1903c). In the same paper, an editorial ( M

ontreal Gazette 1903b) decried the laxity that some police officers had shown. Similarly, the Toronto Globe, which earlier had expressed some sympathy with the union's
position, strongly denounced the violence on Toronto streets in its editorial titled "The
Strike and Public Order": "In British communities we do not plead for the preservation
of the peace and the recognition of the law. We compel respect for the law and due
submission to public authority" ( Toronto Globe 1902b).36 Respect for the official rule
of law was presented as a para- mount value for "British" society.37 Indeed, one legal
commentator, reflecting on recent street railway strikes, reified the law to make his
point: "The law is bound to protect itself. It cannot be violated on any pretext without
injury to society at large, and to the weakening of its legitimate and necessary authority" (O'Brien 1905, 732).
Yet it was public authorities who had to determine when and where to draw the
line and how to enforce it, and on these questions there was often considerable
disagreement. On the one hand, the street railway was often unpopular, and local
officials were sometimes wary of being seen to be taking their side. On the other hand,
civic order was clearly being disturbed, and the rights of the streetcar owners were
being violated. Typically, as the level ofdisorder escalated so did the enforcement
effort; the imperative of maintain- ing civic order increasingly trumped other
considerations. Still, the question of how far to go remained.
Often the first response was to make better use of local police by deploy- ing more
officers or instructing them to enforce the law more strictly. Inten- sification of the
enforcement effort at this stage, however, usually did not involve greater use of force;
guns were rarely drawn, the exception being when crowds attacked police officers in an

effort to free a demonstrator who was being arrested or detained. The bloodiest
confrontation took place during the 1913 street railway strike in Port Arthur and Fort
William, when a crowd estimated at some two thousand attempted to storm a local
police station where a rock-throwing demonstrator was being held. Warning shots failed
to stop the attack, and police fired into the crowd, killing one man and wound- ing
another ( M orning Herald 1913a; Morrison 1974, 241-43).38 This was the only fatality
out of all Canadian street railway strikes. The local press blamed the "foreigners" and
"agitators" for the violence, and local labor leaders did not protest the police reaction;
but Cotton' s Weekly, the official organ of the Socialist Party of Canada, asked, "How
long will this beastly law stand which allowed a uniformed savage to haul out guns and
blaze away into a crowd of toilers?" ( Cotton' s Weekly 1913).
Even the most committed police force lacked the resources to keep unruly crowds
from disrupting streetcar operations. On some occasions, municipalities temporarily
increased the size of their forces by swearing in special constables.39 This became
quite contentious during the 1906 Winnipeg strike when a provincial magistrate,
Alexander McMicken, was alleged to have sworn in one hundred strikebreakers at the
railway company's request. This action uncomfortably blurred the boundary between
public and private spheres of power, and the provincial attorney general suspended
McMicken a few days later pending an investigation (Winnipeg Free Press 1906b,
1906d).
As noted earlier, street railway companies often hired professional strike- breakers and
private security forces to protect their property and continue their operations. The
precise limits on the power of private security forces were not clearly defined, but, as a
general matter, they would have been permitted to use reasonable force to protect
private property. But how much force was reasonable? Private detectives were on
occasion charged with assault, but they typically left town before they could be tried

(Winnipeg Free Press 1906c). Fortunately, their power to use lethal force to protect
private property never had to be legally determined.
The two strongest measures that municipal officials could take were to read the

Riot Act, which required all those present to disperse and authorized the use of force
if they did not, and to call up the militia in aid of the civil power (Morton 1970).
There was no legal test that determined when the Riot Act could be read, but rather it
depended on a judgment by municipal officials about the need for such action.
Generally, they were reluctant to take this step, in part because they did not want
to incur the financial cost of the militia, but more importantly because mayors
generally did not wish to be seen as taking the side of the street railways against
their employees. The tipping point was usually reached when collective violence

°

became more widespread. 4 For example, the militia was first called out several weeks
into the 1899 strike in London, Ontario, after escalating sabotage turned into
collective violence on a Saturday afternoon. Arrests by local police and pleas from the
mayor convinced many of the estimated twenty-five hundred people present to
disperse, but when a large crowd reassembled that evening and attacked more
streetcars, the mayor gave in to pressure from the company and read the Riot Act.
Police were still unable to disperse the crowd, and so the militia was called out. A
small squad of thirty-two soldiers arrived early Sunday morning and dispersed the last
of the crowd. Soldiers remained on duty for twelve days before returning to their
barracks. Even under these circum- stances, the actions of local officials were sharply
criticized. London, Ontario, workers staged a procession mocking the company's lawyer
and a local director for their role in having the militia called out, while the
AASRE journal proclaimed, "If President Everett thought that by getting the militia
out he could scare Johnny Canuck into submission, he was very badly mistaken" (
M otorman and Conductor 1899). Some local newspapers also criticized the decision

to call in the troops, both because of the expense and because the action tarnished
the reputation of the city (Industrial Banner 1899; Palmer 1976, 120-22; Kostal 1999,
302-03). The decisions to use troops in Winnipeg (1906), Hamilton (1906), and Saint
John ( 1914) were not as controversial, but this may be because officials waited longer
before acting.

The response to the presence of the militia very much depended on the role
they were called upon to play. In Toronto, "the moral effect" of the troops' presence,
as Toronto's Chief Constable H. ]. Grasett put it, was sufficient to put an end to the
disturbances, and so there was nothing in their conduct to criticize (Toronto City
Council M inutes 1903, 51). Similarly, the troops called up in Winnipeg largely

remained in the background. Where troops played a more active role, they were more
likely to meet resistance or to be criticized for their conduct. In Saint John, for
example, eight members of the Royal Canadian Dragoons who charged through the
crowd were met by a barrage of stones and other missiles and forced to withdraw and
await reinforcements ( Saint John Globe 1914). In Hamilton, the sheriff read the Riot Act
and police, backed by the troops, stormed into the crowd, the police swinging their
batons while the mounted soldiers used the flat sides of their swords to move anyone
who resisted. Afterwards, Colonel Septimus Denison, the commander of the troops,
expressed surprise at the antagonism they encountered from "seemingly good citizens" (

Hamilton S pectator 1906b; Morton 1970, 424-25). Those citizens, including several
aldermen, were just as quick to condemn the actions of the police, accusing them of
being overly zealous in their use of force. In contrast, the troops did not attract much
criticism, although some merchants refused to sell them provisions or found their
teamsters unwilling to deliver to them ( Hamilton Spectator 1906c; Weaver 1990, 115;
Heron forthcoming).41
Courts also became involved in maintaining civic order, largely through their
treatment of those charged with crimes arising out of the demonstra- tions. Police
magistrates heard the bulk of the cases, but county court judges also became involved
when the charges were more serious or if the accused elected to be tried by judge and
jury. However, no cases went to higher courts, and thus there are no reported
judgments arising out of these prosecutions. The severity of the sentences imposed upon
convicted participants in the collective violence varied considerably, depending on the
predilections of the individual judge as well as the judge's assessment of the
seriousness of the individual act, the level of disorder, and the need to send a clear

message that unlawful behavior was unacceptable. For example, Magistrate Denison
dealt quite harshly with those that were brought before him for their actions in the 1886
Toronto street railway strike (Tucker 1994, 298-301), while Magistrate Daly in
Winnipeg was far more lenient with those charged with strike-related offenses in 1906
and 1910 (Winnipeg Free Press 1906e, 1910a). Accused strikebreakers usually slipped
out of town before their cases came to trial.
In sum, streetplace or civic order during street railway strikes was imper- fectly
maintained. Large crowds sympathetic to the aims of strikers repeatedly violated the
law, and, for periods of time, local officials and police lacked both the commitment and
the resources to fully protect the property and contract rights of street railway
companies to operate with scab labor on public streets. Yet there was a breaking point,
however imperfectly defined, which if crossed triggered the use of coercive force to
suppress collective violence and restore streetplace order, the effect of which was also
to help sustain workplace and marketplace orders within a range that kept the
liberal order of Canadian capitalism "on track."42

CONCLUSION

As this case study of collective

action by Canadian

streetcar workers

demonstrates, the project of constructing and maintaining a liberal capitalist order
took place at a number of sites, each of which was, at different times and places and to
different degrees, contested by workers and working-class com- munities acting
collectively to achieve their vision of a legitimate workplace, marketplace, and
streetplace order. Employers and state officials understood that these three dimensions
ofliberal ordering overlapped and that challenges in one could have spillover effects
in another. For that reason, for example, employers and officials made efforts to
prevent collective action that contested the workplace order from harming the
marketplace economic order, both by compelling conciliation in those sectors of the

economy where workers' capacity to disrupt was particularly great and by limiting
broader labor solidar- ity. Similarly, the impact of workplace conflict on the streetplace
order was also to be contained, whether the source of the disruption was collective
action by striking workers or, in the case of the street railways, by sympathetic members
of working-class communities. In tum, limitations on the ability of workers' collective
action to disrupt the marketplace or streetplace order limited their power to challenge
and transform the workplace order.
Yet, while worker collective action clashed with the project of construct- ing the
order of liberal capitalism, it could not be suppressed entirely; nor could the space
for workers' collective action in the workplace, marketplace, and streetplace order
simply be confined by fixing legal limits on what was acceptable according to the
ideal of liberal ordering. Rather, actual orders were created through processes of
conflict and accommodation that reflected shifting balances of power and changing
ideas about the scope of legitimate conduct, which developed within the context of
the historical legacy of constitutional, political, legal, and institutional arrangements.
Moreover, as this study of Canadian street railway strikes demonstrates, the actual
opera- tion of liberal orders at any given time and place was, within a certain range,
determined by local conditions, individual predilections of legal and political officials,
and other contingent factors. Although the frequency and severity of the challenge to
the streetplace order posed by street railway strikes was exceptional compared to
strikes by most other workers, 43 and the responses were so variable, it is precisely
these features that make collective action by street railway workers such a rich
illustration of the complexity surrounding the construction, maintenance, and
development of liberal orders.

NOTES

1. Following Charles Tilly (2003, 18), I have avoided using the word "riot" to categorize
collective violence, since it imports a normative judgment made by public authorities about the
nature of the conduct.
2. For an insightful discussion of the multiple dimensions of capitalist social ordering, see
de Sousa Santos (2002, chap. 6).
3. The Knights of Labor was a nineteenth-century union established in Philadelphia that
grew rapidly in the 1880s and equally as rapidly declined. It was distinguished by its inclusiveness, in contrast to more traditional craft unions. On the Knights of Labor in Ontario, see
Kealey and Palmer (1982). On the Knights of Labor in the United States, see Fink (1983).
4. I have intentionally avoided usage of the more common term "public order" because it
reinforces a common assumption I wish to challenge, namely, that workplace and marketplace orders
are private.
5. For a brief discussion of this history, see Tilly (2008, 62-87).

6. I draw on McKay ( 2000), who makes the important analytical distinction "between the
liberal order as a principle of rule and the often partisan historical forms this principle has taken
through 150 years of Canadian history" (623).

7. On the distinction between the "high law" of the judges and the "low law" of the
magistrates, see Hay (1992) and Karsten (2002, 1-18).
8. The Toronto Street Railway was briefly owned and operated by the municipality in
1891 after one franchise elapsed and before another was granted, while the Calgary and Port
Arthur and Fort William street railway systems were municipally owned from their inception
(Sinclair 1891; Armstrong and Nelles 1986, 241-43; High 1997).
9. For an overview of working conditions, see Lambly (1983, chap. 1). The Toronto
Railway Company provided motormen and conductors with a detailed rulebook governing their
conduct (see Toronto Railway Company 1902).
10. For example, the Toronto Railway Company kept their employees under close surveillance, and their Records of Suspensions of Motormen 1899-1903 (Toronto Archives) contain
voluminous reports of employee misconduct ranging from serious matters like "being in liquor"
or causing a collision to relatively minor ones like gossiping with passengers, missing a fare, or
running ahead of time. No reports of trade union activity are entered on the records. The
widespread use of private detective agencies to spy on street railway employees led the Trades
and Labour Congress to pass a resolution calling for a law to make it a criminal offense to
discharge an employee based on evidence furnished by a private detective ( Labour Gazette
1914c). For a study of the practice in the United States, see Jennifer Luff (2008).
11. Other groups of street railway employees included laborers, shop workers, and office
workers. Of these, the only ones that are likely to have unionized are craft workers engaged in
the shops, but they had major conflicts with the street railway companies during this period.

12. On paternalism and welfarism in Canadian street railway operations, see Roy (1972,
19-73); Lambly (1983, 39--40); Armstrong and Nelles (1986, 227); Labour Gazette (1903c,
1903e). For the United States, see Emmons (1911) and Molloy (1996).
13. The union later changed its name to the Amalgamated Association of Street and
Electric Railway Employees to reflect the change in technology.
14. For examples of second strikes after the collapse of a prior agreement, see Table 1
(Toronto, 1886; London, 1899; and Montreal, 1903).
15. In 1899 the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) passed a resolution calling for a law
that would require street railway drivers to serve a thirty-day apprenticeship and pass an
examination (Trades and Labour Congress of Canada 1899, 27). No legislative action followed.
For the Ontario hours of work legislation, see An Act to Amend the Ontario Railway and
Municipal Board Act S. 0. 1912, c. 37. In response to complaints made by street railway
companies, the original Ontario bill was amended to also specify that "whenever practical and
reasonable" the ten hours should be performed within twelve consecutive hours (Toronto Globe
1912). A delegation of the TLC had requested legislation for the protection of workers on street
railways as early as 1903 (Labour Gazette 1903a).
16. The Hamilton street railway interpreted the clause as allowing voluntary overtime at a
rate of pay less than the minimum stipulated, a matter disputed by the men (see Motonnan and
Conductor 1899, 577-78). For a discussion ofother prolabor measures enacted by Hamilton City
Council, see Heron (forthcoming).
17. For the Nova Scotia legislation, see An Act "Of Street Railway Companies" S. N .S.
1911, c. 11, and An Act to Amend Chapter 11, Acts of 1911, entitled "Of Street Railway

Companies," amended by S. N.S. 1913, c. 52. Most protections did not come into force until
deemed necessary or feasible by the Public Utilities Board. An application by the union to have
these provisions brought into force was rejected by the board in 1914 ( Labour Gazette 1915).
Later that year, the legislature amended the law to make air brakes and instruction mandatory.
18. New contracts were successfully negotiated without resort to strikes or lockouts using
the agreement's conciliation process in 1904 and 1907 ( Labour Gazette 1904, 1907b).
19. The Hamilton case has been studied in more detail by Palmer ( 1979, 209-16), Lambly
(1983, 59--60), and Heron (forthcoming). The union barely hung on in the aftermath of the
1906 strike. The president of the union that led the strike was sacked a year later, allegedly for
union activity, and there were charges of discrimination against union members. A majority of
an !DIA board dismissed the union's complaint. In subsequent years, street railway management
signed agreements with the union that included, among other provisions, a recognition clause
and a grievance procedure. This was an accomplishment in an era when most Hamilton
employers were becoming even more fiercely antiunion (Heron forthcoming).
20. The other innovation was increased judicial involvement in limiting the tactics of
strikers through the use of injunctions. This development will not be addressed here because
injunctions were rarely sought in street railway strikes. One exception was during the 1910
strike in Winnipeg, when garment and cap makers were locked out as a result of their refusal to
make uniforms for the street railway during the strike ( Labour Gazette 191lb, 191lc).

21. For example, the Winnipeg Free Press ( l 906i) estimated the cost of the three-day 1906
strike to the company ($40,000), the men ($21,000), and the public ($21,000), but this was
mostly based on guesswork.
22. The one exception was a legislative scheme in Nova Scotia that only applied to coal
mines. Workers and employers faced sanctions for engaging in strikes or lockouts prior to
making a request for arbitration; either party could apply for arbitration, and the other could be
compelled to participate; and arbitration awards, which could establish wage rates, were binding
(McCallum 1990). This law, as well as the others, proved to be ineffective and was rarely
invoked.
23. As noted above, a compulsory arbitration clause was subsequently agreed to and relied
upon to resolve a number of disputes. See Toronw Globe (1902c; 1902e) for further editorial
comments on the strike.
24. For other instances in which IDIA boards upheld management discipline against union
officials, often over union nominee dissents, see Labour Gazette (1911a) (for Winnipeg) and
Labour Gazette (1913b) (for Port Arthur).
25. The quote comes from the board's report on the Saint John dispute arising, in part,
over the termination of the union president, Fred Ramsey. Ultimately, to resolve the dispute,
Ramsey was offered and accepted a lifetime position with the city's public works department (
Labour Gazette 1914a; Babcock 1994, 24).

26. In another dispute an !DIA board also called for recognition of the AASRE union in
Saint John, but the employer refused. A violent strike followed that ended without union
recognition being gained (Lambly 1983, 75-77).
27. I treat this topic at greater length in Tucker (2009).
28. These criteria, "level of coordination" and "salience of violence," are used by Tiily
(2003) to construct a very helpful typology of collective violence. Collective violence in street
railway strikes tended to range between Tiily's categories of "scattered attacks" and "brawls,"
both of which are characterized by low levels of coordination but that differ in regard to the
salience of violence.
29. The broad similarities over time and place in the distinctive practices of street railway
unions, crowds of sympathizers, street railway owners, and state officials fit nicely into Tiily's (
1993) concept of repertoires of contention as "learned cultural creations" that "emerge from
struggle" (264) and shape the behavior of all those involved in the conflict. Tiily (2008)
subsequently elaborated on these ideas.
30. For background and discussion of this act, see Atherton (1972, chap. 9) and Riddell
(1921).
31. On the question of the legality of boycotts at the time, see Tucker (1994, 308--29) and
Tucker and Fudge (1996, 107-10). No legal actions were brought against street railway unions
for organizing boycotts despite expressions of concern, such as the following that appeared in
the M onetary Times (1899, 171): "The boycott is being used as an instrument of tyranny,
affecting people absolutely innocent of any connection with the strikers or the company. That
it is possible to so expand the limits of a dispute is evidence of the power which labor now
exercises in its contest with capital."
32. On history of the Riot Act, see Gilmour (1993, 135-36).

33. On the hostility of local elites in the Port Arthur and Fort William to foreigners, see
Morrison (1974, 242-50; 1976).
34. The chief's reflexive use of the phrase "citizens and their wives" captures the dominant
understanding that women, who were still denied the vote, were not themselves full citizens
(Strong-Boag 2002). More generally, his disappointment was rooted in the expectation that the
respectable classes, above all others, would comport themselves along bourgeois norms of
legitimate behavior on public streets. For other sources identifying the presence of women in the
crowd, see Palmer (1976, 121) and Babcock (1982, 18).

35. The linkage between the working class and wider community support originated with
Gutman (1976), who is cited by many of the scholars writing about street railway strikes. For
example, see Palmer (1979, 216), Henry (1991, 352), Babcock (1994, 372), and Ziegler (1977,
71).
36. The M onetary Times (1886a) expressed a similar concern about the police depart- ment's
failure to control mob violence during the March 1886 strike, but it complimented the police
commissioner's more forceful response to the May 1886 strike-related violence ( M onetary Times
1886b).
37. In the context of Toronro at the tum of the twentieth century, the identification of the
community as British would not have been viewed as particularly controversial, although the
meaning of being "British" was contested by workers who sometimes invoked the historic rights
of freeborn British subjects to support their workplace demands (Reimer 1993; Komeski 2007).
38. There were two other reports of police discharging firearms. During the 1913 Saint John
strike, a police officer fired his gun and wounded a demonstrator (Babcock 1982, 18), and during
the 1910 Winnipeg strike, a police officer fired a gun at a window breaker (Winnipeg Free Press
1910b). During the 1906 Hamilton strike, a police officer drew his gun but did not fire it (
Hamilton Spectator 1906a).
39. For example, during the May 1903 street railway strike in Montreal, firemen were sworn
in as special police ( M ontreal Gazette 1903d).
40. The exception was during the 1902 Toronto street railway strike when local officials
hastily called in the militia at the first sign of disorder, an action for which they were widely
criticized both by the labor movement and the local press (Toronto Globe 1902d, 1902e).
41. There is some suggestion in the newspaper accounts that the troops were reluctant to
use force and that the ground troops refused to make a bayonet charge after being ordered to do
so by Colonel Denison ( Hamilton Spectator 1906b).
42. Kostal (1999, 310) makes a similar point.
43. The closest comparison is mining strikes, which often involved the entire mining
community and tended to occur in isolated towns populated largely by miners and their families.
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